Iran war madness
Plus, China’s last war and Germany’s next war
One of the late Robert Duvall’s best roles was Colonel Kilgore in the Vietnam drama Apocalypse Now (1979). The war-mad Kilgore strutted the battlefield as his men sought cover from bullets and shrapnel. He ordered a helicopter attack to destroy a seaside village so he could surf. And he delivered the unforgettable line: “I love the smell of napalm in the morning.”
Kilgore comes to mind when listening to a deranged President Trump try to answer questions aboard Air Force One about why he might attack Iran — again! Trump does not know what napalm smells like, but he seems enthralled by the power, spectacle, and destruction wrought by air war. Neither he nor any top administration official has bothered to fully explain why they may desecrate the Constitution and international law again through an unprovoked attack on a country that poses no serious threat to the United States. Moreover, the president claimed last June — it was nonsense, of course — that U.S. bombing raids “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. If obliterated, why would another strike be necessary then?
Making war without congressional approval is far too easy. The allure of air power makes presidents overconfident. Trump has dispatched enough military power to the Persian Gulf to prosecute a sustained offensive, although he says he still wants a deal with Tehran. What he really wants is for the ayatollahs to capitulate. As the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi says, “The ‘deal’ Trump has put forward entails Tehran completely giving up its nuclear program in return for no NEW sanctions, but no actual sanctions relief. This is, of course, a non-starter for Iran.”
In today’s special bonus episode (gift link) of History As It Happens, the Cato Institute’s Justin Logan, an expert on U.S. foreign policy, talks about how the U.S. returned to the brink of war in a region of minimal strategic importance.
Donald Trump, like many of his predecessors, promised to be a peacemaker. “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end — and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” he said in his second inaugural address. Better luck next time! The New York Times reminds us, “Mr. Trump is now considering what would be at least the seventh American military attack in another country in the past year, and his second on Iran.”
Logan and I discuss the pattern of the imperial presidency. Time after time, the U.S. intervenes in the Middle East. Our leaders promise success, quick and clean; failure inevitably follows. But it wouldn’t be a pattern without what happens next. Try what failed in Country X in Country Y. And when it fails once more, try it anew in Country Z.
China’s last war
Xi Jinping is purging his generals in another dramatic step to remake China’s military, a process that began in 2012.
In Tuesday’s episode of History As It Happens, David Finkelstein, an expert on Chinese military and security affairs at CNA, attempts to answer a very difficult question: how can anyone know whether China can fight and win a war? The mass purges could delay any plans to absorb Taiwan, but there’s also the fact that China has not fought a war since 1979. Not one Chinese soldier today has fired a rifle in anger.
In 1979, China invaded Vietnam to punish it for having invaded Cambodia the year prior, toppling the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, a Chinese client. More than 200,000 troops of the People’s Liberation Army crossed into Vietnam on February 17, 1979. A month later, it was over. The invasion accomplished little.
As Finkelstein explains, Xi’s military reforms have been designed to make China excel in joint operations in its East Asian littoral. Whether Beijing’s massive investments in the army and navy can produce victory if fighting breaks out in Taiwan, the South China Sea, or some other flashpoint, no one can really say.
Germany’s next war
Germany has not fought a war since 1945 — and thank goodness for that. Two world wars and the mass murder of millions of innocent people were quite enough. For decades after, the possibility of a revanchist and militarily powerful Germany haunted statesmen. For example, Margaret Thatcher initially opposed reunification (after the Berlin Wall fell) out of fear that the new Germany would become too dominant in Europe.
Today, the picture is quite different. Germany’s neighbors welcome its massive rearmament to deter Russia. However, Berlin’s increased military spending (now No. 4 in the world) is creating new challenges. In today’s episode, historian and political scientist Liana Fix discusses her excellent essay in Foreign Affairs delving into why Poland and France, to name two, are a little uncomfortable. It has far less to do with the potential return of German militarism than with more mundane matters of national prestige and competition.
Liana Fix teaches at Georgetown University. She is a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, whose official publication is Foreign Affairs. Among the subjects we cover in the podcast is the permanent deployment of a combat-ready armored brigade to Lithuania, which is the first time that German troops have been stationed long-term in another country since 1945. If NATO’s Article 5 obligation is going to have any credibility from Moscow’s vantage, there may be more such deployments in the coming years.
What’s next?
Both episodes next week will mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. My guests will be Michael Kimmage, Mark Galeotti, and Nina Khrushcheva. In the meantime, you can read (no paywall) Khrushcheva’s essay in Foreign Affairs about her recent trip to Putin’s Russia.